Next MeetUp
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Trust and Religious Diversity
The diversity of religions is widely regarded as one of the most serious problems for belief in any particular religion. Given such diversity, how can the religious person conscientiously retain their belief? Linda Zagzebski claims [article below] that it ultimately comes down to self-trust. She argues that any normal life must include a significant degree of self-trust in our belief-forming faculties, which depends on the extent to which we behave in an intellectually admirable ways. This means that we should admire similarly conscientious believers of other faiths, but not necessarily that we should abandon our own faith, given the nature of self-trust. How does this work, and is she right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 1 July, @ Junction Inn Hotel 
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Past MeetUps
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Can We be Harmed After We are Dead?
To paraphrase Epicurus, we cannot be harmed by events after our deaths, since they do not occur while we are alive, and we are no longer around when they do. Some disagree. Some say that we can be harmed before we die, if (eg) we adopt a project that is doomed to fail after we die. Others say that we can be harmed after we die, since death can harm us, in particular at the point of death, and if we can be harmed at that point then we can be harmed later on. Others agree with Epicurus. But, in that case, why should we "respect the wishes of the dead", if doing otherwise would not harm them? Indeed, why would "murder" be wrong, if death were nothing to us? How can we resolve this conundrum? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 3 June, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Is a Hole a Thing?
A hole is a strange thing, if is it any thing at all. It is not an abstract entity (like a number), but it is made of nothing (the glass is not the hole, nor the beer it holds). So what is it? The portion of space-time at which it is found—but then how could holes move? The boundary of the material "surrounding" it—but then how is the beer "in" the glass? Or something else? A negative part of its material host, like the hole in a doughnut? A disturbance within its material host, like a knot in a rope? Or perhaps holes do not exist at all, since all truths seemingly about holes just boil down to truths about holed objects. We'll try to get to the bottom of it. 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 6 May, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Is All Belief Ultimately a Matter of Faith?
Some people think that religious beliefs, like everyday beliefs, are matters for evidence. Others think that they are unlike ordinary beliefs, being matters of faith instead. But there is a third way, or so argues Duncan Pritchard [article below]. After all, what evidence is there that you aren't in the Matrix? And if you cannot be sure you aren't, then how can you be so sure about your belief in the everyday world? As you are. So, perhaps, all belief—religious and non-religious alike—is ultimately a matter of faith rather than evidence. Is this right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 March, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Why Contractarianism?
Nietzsche predicted in the late 1800's that morality would face a crisis, just like the one suffered by religion: "As the will to truth gains self-consciousness, morality will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle reserved for the next two centuries in Europe". The problem is that moral language presumes objective values, but scientific truth denies such things. But even if we cannot do what is right, we can still do what we prefer. If morality is not to perish, therefore, its place must be found within this so-called contractarian way of thinking. Or so claims David Gauthier. Is he right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 February, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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The Gamer's Dilemma
Most people agree that murder is wrong, but, within computer games, it scarcely raises an eyebrow, since no one is actually killed in a computer game. But shouldn't the same apply to virtual sexual assault, for the same reason? If no-one is actually abused in acts of virtual sexual assault (that is, life-like simulations of the actual practice), does that mean we should disregard these acts with the same abandon we do virtual murder? How could the latter be morally permitted in virtual reality, but not the former? In this session, we examine various arguments that there is a morally relevant difference between the two. 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 3 December, @ venue TBA |
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Is the Gap between Rich and Poor Fair?
The soaring cost of living is renewing questions about the gap between rich and poor. The wealthiest ten per cent of households in the UK own 43% of the country’s wealth, so is it naïve to suggest that the poorest should get more help and the richest should pay for it? What justifies redistributing wealth? Is it wrong to accumulate enormous personal wealth? Or is it acceptable for some people to become fantastically rich, provided that nobody is truly poor? These are some of the topics addressed by the four panelists and their four "witnesses" on the BBC Radio 4 program The Moral Maze of 15 Jun this year [podcast here]. How equal should we want to be? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 5 November, @ Junction Inn Hotel |
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Should the State De-gender Care-giving?
Women continue to be in charge of most child-rearing; men continue to be responsible for most bread-winning. Is this state-of-affairs a matter of justice to be tackled by state action, as feminists demand, or must the state remain neutral on these private decisions, as political liberals claim? Anca Heaus [file below] provides three arguments – relating to equal opportunity, gender specialization, and gender socialization – in support of policies to de-gender care-giving and compensate women for the costs they incur by being primary care-givers. Is she right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 1 October, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Inaugural Mini-Conference : Program
10.30-11.15. Paul Walker (co-authored with Terry Lovat), “The Other – a Troublesome Dyad?”. Abstract: We see two conceptions of “The Other” in moral philosophy and we contend that they might be in tension. The “near other” is like me, someone with whom I can intuitively empathise. The “far other” is different to me, not within my in-group loyalty optic, and is (often times) “over there”, out of my near view. We contend that evidence suggests we do not reliably transfer our transcendent metaphysical empathy for the near-other to the far-other. 11.15-12.00. Joe Mintoff, “Who Owns the World?”. Abstract: John Locke claims that God gave the world to humans in common. This might mean that the world is no-one’s property (res nullius), or a common possession (res communis), or public property (res publica), or that it is the common heritage of humankind (res communis humanitatis). I argue that, if humanity owns the world in common, it is as a common possession, in the sense that every individual may use the world as they please, without the consent of others, and that—perhaps—they may also appropriate portions of it, if this is consistent with respecting others' humanity. I conclude by very briefly enumerating some historical accounts of original acquisition. 10.15-12.00pm Saturday 3 September, @ Junction Inn Hotel 
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A Duty to Become More Altruistic?
Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence’s demands be made consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? Tom Dougherty argues [article below] that it can, if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence. On this view, our duty to give is indeed bounded by the level of our moral development, but we also have a moral duty to become increasingly altruistic. Is he right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 6 August, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Preferring a Genetically Related Child?
Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. Arguably, according to Tina Rulli [article below, and Philosopher's Zone discussion here], people have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. But prospective parents typically prefer that their children are genetically related to them, for various reasons: for parent-child physical resemblance, family resemblance, or psychological similarity, for the sake of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. How good are these reasons? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 2 July, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Can Tolerance be Repressive?
If so-called cancel culture is any indication, these days some people seem to think that tolerating certain opinions can be repressive. Over fifty years ago, Herbert Marcuse also thought so, arguing that what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance in many of its most effective manifestations serves the cause of oppression. Accordingly, realizing the objective of tolerance requires intolerance towards views that silence those suffering from inequality and discrimination. Is he right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 June, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Is More Choice Better than Less?
Perhaps not, since choice comes with costs. It often makes decisions harder, opens up greater scope for regret, and it foists responsibility on us. It might lead us into temptation, can undermine our commitment to others, and it sometimes makes things worse. Given all this, Gerald Dworkin [below] concludes that, even though having choices is of intrinsic and instrumental value, this does not imply that more choice are always better than less. As in so many other things, so with choice, that enough is enough. Is he right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 7 May, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Is it Illiberal to Ban the Burqa?
Various European nations have in recent years outlawed the wearing of face-coverings in public (see here). Relying on the liberal arguments of J S Mill, some opponents charge that this infringes the autonomy of Muslim women. Some proponents (such as Thomas Wells, here) respond that, actually, the effect of such laws is to enhance autonomy overall, and that there is a liberal justification for banning the burqa, so long as various empirical conditions are met. So who is right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 2 April, @ Junction Inn Hotel |
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Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?
According to Nick Bostrom, we can't rule out the possibility that we are living in a computer simulation, since we can't rule out that we will evolve to become 'post-humans' who—having enormous computing power—will run great numbers of simulations of their evolutionary history, in such fine-grained detail that the simulated people would be conscious. If we could evolve into these post-humans, what is to say that they do not already exist and that we are their simulation? Is Bostrom right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 5 March 2022, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Peter Singer on Pandemic Ethics
The COVID pandemic has raised many questions. Are lockdowns and mandatory vaccines morally justified? What should governments have done differently? Rebecca Tuvel, Dan Cullen and Eric Samson interview Peter Singer [video here] on these questions, as well as why there were calls [reported here] to cancel their discussion in the first place. In the final tNP MeetUp for the year, we consider pandemic ethics in general and Singer's views in particular. 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 December, venue TBA |
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What is Power?
It is good to have power, or so many think. But what is power, exactly? Steven Lukes [below] suggests that it is about getting others to do what you want, and that it has three dimensions, the overt power to prevail in a conflict, the covert power to set the agenda, and – perhaps most insidious – the power to influence people's beliefs and desires. Socrates [below] disagrees, and argues that, if power really is a good thing, then few of those winners, agenda-setters or influencers have any power at all. Is Lukes correct in his analysis of power, and what argument does Socrates give for his surprising conclusion? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 6 November, via Zoom
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The Tedium of Immortality?
None of us wants to die, but do we really want to live forever? The mind boggles. Would those people in a million years really be us? And would such lives eventually become too tedious? Bernard Williams says that an immortal life (even a healthy one) is not worthy of choice for human beings. Thomas Nagel disagrees, saying that, given a choice each Monday about whether to live for another week, he would always choose the extra week (health permitting). John Martin Fisher [link here, and easy-listening BBC Radio 4 discussion here] tries to adjudicate the debate, arguing in effect that an immortal life need be no worse than a never-ending long-haul flight between Sydney and LA. But is that a good defense of eternal life? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 2 October, via Zoom
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Can Meritocracy do the Job?
It seems obvious that choosing people for jobs and other positions should be based on merit. But, more and more, some have come to doubt the value of doing so. Michael Sandel, in his recent book The Tyranny of Merit [introduced in this video, summarized at this blog, and conclusion attached below] argues that our society is not actually meritocratic, and, more fundamentally, that even a perfect meritocracy would be unjust and would not be a good society in which to live, since it would lead to inequality and make people's lives depend too much on brute luck. Is Sandel right? Should we choose meritocracy? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 September, via Zoom
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What do Boomers owe Millennials?
According to some, like Jill Filipovic in her provocative book OK Boomer, Let's Talk [Introduction attached below], millennials (aged 24-40) face substantial financial, employment and health woes, for which baby boomers (56-74) are largely to blame. But is this right? It depends on what justice requires in general, and how that applies to conflicts between generations [see Gosseries & Meyer, below, canvassing the main philosophical views]. However, according to others, like Roberts & Allen in their Conversation article [link here], the real issue is not some new inter-generational conflict, but rather yet another installment of the conflict between the haves and the have-nots. 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 7 August, via Zoom
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What, if Anything, Matters?
Some people think that nothing really matters—we are but tiny specks in the vastness of the universe, and in a million years we will be long forgotten. It will be as if we never existed. Others lament that we are all on an elaborate journey leading nowhere—we study and work to pay for clothing, housing, and food, to sustain ourselves from year to year, to support a family and pursue a career, but to what final end? It will all be annihilated, sooner rather than later. There is a conflict between how seriously we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of thinking of them as arbitrary, open to doubt. It's absurd. Or is it? And, if life is absurd, how should we feel about it? Despair? Defiance? Or—as Thomas Nagel suggests [text below]—irony? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 3 July, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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A Global Panopticon to Save the World?
Many are worried about increasing surveillance in society. But, according to the Vulnerable World Hypothesis, if technological development continues as it has, then at some point we will attain set of capabilities—eg, home-made biological weapons—that make the devastation of civilization extremely likely, if civilization remains in its current semi-anarchic situation. According to Nick Bostrom [abridged text below, full text here], intense and comprehensive surveillance under strong global governance would offer protection against this possibility, and this is a considerable reason in favor of bringing about the Global Panopticon. Is he right? Should we learn to love the cameras? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 5 June, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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A Universal Basic Income?
Concerns about new technology and now COVID-19 have led some to advocate a so-called Universal Basic Income, a scheme to provide all persons, rich or poor, with an unconditional income to protect all from poverty. Surprisingly, the proposal has support on both the left and the right, from Guardian columnist Tim Dunlop [here], who argues that it is our rightful inheritance that recognizes our common membership of society, to pragmatic libertarian Matt Zwolinski [here], who thinks it would involve less bureaucracy, cost, rent-seeking, and intrusion than the welfare state. Are they right? Or should the fact that left and right agree make us wary? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 1 May, @ Junction Inn Hotel |
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Who Owns the Moon?
The recent discovery of ice on the moon has re-motivated old questions about original acquisition. After explaining the relevant sections of the Apollo-era Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement, and what he thinks is wrong with them, Dennison Butler [link here] ends up endorsing a neo-Lockean Homesteading approach. By contrast, Alan Marshall [abridged text below] thinks that this heralds a new round of imperialism, and prefers to see the moon as the Common Heritage of Humanity. But these are not the only options, and Virgiliu Pop [sections 5.1-5.2 of his book, below] describes others between the two. So, could anyone own land on the moon, or the resources it holds? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 3 April, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Must we take the COVID vaccine? Should it be mandatory?
The recent release of various COVID-19 vaccines raises old questions about the relation between individual freedom and collective welfare, for they seem to pit bodily autonomy against herd immunity. David Copp and Gerald Dworkin argue [here and here] that, given certain factual conditions, we ought to take the vaccine and it ought to be mandatory, but Julian Savulescu [here] opts for a more nuanced approach. So ought we to take the vaccine? And should it be mandatory? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 6 March, @ Junction Inn Hotel |
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Does Philosophy Make Progress?
Disagreement between philosophers is ubiquitous and inevitable. In any other area, this would justify, if not demand, profound pessimism. But does disagreement imply lack of progress? And does lack of progress demand pessimism? David Chalmers [attached below] wonders why there hasn't been large collective convergence to the truth on the big questions of philosophy, examines a number of suggestions, suggests that progress might be possible, and concludes that we will just have to keep doing philosophy to find out. Is he right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 6 February 2021, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Is it Time to Re-Value the Manual Arts?
Unlike philosophers, tradesmen do not doubt their progress. The motorbike is fixed, or it isn't. According to Matthew Crawford [link here], this concrete manifestation of oneself in the world is one of many advantages that manual competence has over more ghostly or sociable forms of modern labor. By contrast, Kalefa Sanneh [link here] thinks that Crawford over-values work focused on concrete things rather than on ideas or people, over-estimates the viability and profitability of such work in the modern economy, and, in large part, merely pines for lost masculinity in a post-manly age. So who is right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 7 November, @ Junction Inn Hotel |
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If Gender Transition is Acceptable, why not Racial Transition?
In 2015, Bruce Jenner's transition to become Caitlyn Jenner was hailed on the cover of Vanity Fair. By contrast, that same year, Rachel Dolezal's transition from a white to a black identity caused widespread outrage. Are these responses consistent? Rebecca Tuvel [attached] argues that they are not, that the considerations that support transgenderism apply equally to transracialism. The contrast raises questions about the nature of gender and race, and the extent to which either is determined by biological factors or self-identification. How should we understand these notions? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 3 October, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Could Post-Persons Exist, and Should We be Afraid of Them?
From the way we behave, we seem to think that humans have greater moral status than animals, that we may use them for our ends. But what if the shoe were on the other foot? Nick Agar [text below] thinks that there could there be creatures – so-called post-persons – with greater moral status than us, but that we would have reason to fear them, and so it would be wrong to risk creating them. Thomas Douglas [text below] thinks otherwise, that the existence of such beings need not worsen our situation, and that, even if it did, the greater value of their lives might still justify creating them. So, could post-persons exist, and should we be afraid of them? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 5 September, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Beyond the Medical and Social Models of Disability?
What is a disability? According to the so-called Medical Model, disability is an impairment, an objective dysfunction in the individual. According to the Social Model, it is a form of discrimination, the reflection of an exclusionary and unaccommodating social system. According to Shakespeare and Watson [text attached below], we need to get beyond these models, in part because it is unclear whether there is actually a distinction between the two, or indeed any qualitative difference between disabled people and non-disabled people. Who is right, and what (if any) moral difference does it make? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 1 August, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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How Should Acute-Care Medical Resources be Allocated?
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to difficult medical decisions, for example about how to allocate scarce resources such as ventilators, more so in some countries than others. The emergency has raised questions of general moral principle. Should these decisions be based solely on utility, with the aim of saving as many lives as possible? But what about fairness, which is so important in other contexts? We consider the perspectives of doctors [See Troug et. al., below] and philosophers [See Verweij, below] on this vexed issue. How should these life-and-death decisions be made? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 July, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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What Does Ubuntu Have to Teach Us?
A central maxim of the southern African ethics of ubuntu is that "a person is a person through other persons". But what does this mean, exactly, and what does it imply about how we should treat each other? In his quest for a distinctively African moral theory, Thaddeus Metz [text below] explains various interpretations, concluding with the idea that morality is at bottom a function of producing a certain kind of harmonious relationship. We ask which (if any) of these interpretations to accept, and how (if at all) African ethics can supplement our own Western ethics. 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 6 June, via Zoom
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Should Our Respect for People be Extended to Animals?
Respect is at the heart of morality. We should not treat others like mere things, but as persons, as rational and self-conscious beings who are valuable in themselves. This seems to exclude animals, since they are not rational beings in the relevant sense, However, drawing on Hume's discussion of religion and on Kant's account of morality, Christine Korsgaard argues [here] that an important part of respect for a person involves respect for their animal nature, a consideration that clearly applies to animals as well. But does respect for humanity imply humane treatment of animals? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 2 May, via Zoom
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Should We Give to Charity Until it Hurts?
If you came across a child flailing in a shallow pool, you would not hesitate to save her, even at the cost of an expensive pair of shoes. The shoes are of no comparable moral significance to a life, you would say. This reasoning has radical implications, however. According to Peter Singer [abridged chapter attached below, and a slick three minute video summary here], it implies that if we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance then we ought to do it, and he notes that many of things in our lives – overseas holidays, comfortable houses, etc – are not of comparable significance to the lives we could save if we lived more modestly. Is Singer right? Should we give till it hurts? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 4 April, via Zoom
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Should We Abolish Morality?
Many people think that God does not exist, and that the right thing to do as a result is to stop using God language. But God is not the only one dead, these days. Some people – like John Mackie – think that Morality does not exist. Suppose they are right. What to do as a result? Some say we should keep using moral language, and keep believing in Morality, because it is useful. Some say we should keep using moral language, but only as a pretense, for the same reason. And some – like Richard Garner [text attached below] – say we should abolish all moral talk, since it is false (as we are supposing), and since it is actually harmful. But can we do without morality? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 7 March, @ Junction Inn Hotel
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Are Deep-Learning Algorithms Biased?
Deep-learning algorithms find patterns in big data, and apply them in the pursuit of their set goals. But sometimes their decisions have disparate impacts, and they perpetuate disadvantage. In 2016, such a conflict arose about COMPAS, an algorithm used to estimate the likelihood a defendant will re-offend. The algorithm was used to make bail and sentencing decisions, and its predictions are about 70% accurate. But among defendants who ultimately did not re-offend, blacks were more than twice as likely as whites to be classified as medium or high risk. This led some [here] to accuse it of bias. Others [here] argued that matters are more complex. Either way, what should we do about it? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 1 February 2020, @ Junction Inn Hotel |
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How Should We Spend Our Leisure?
According to Aristotle, happiness depends on leisure, since we work for the sake of leisure, and fill leisure with things done for their own sakes. For this reason, according to Alex Sager [here], thinking about leisure encourages us to turn our attention to the nature of the good life. So, how should we spend our leisure? It doesn't matter, many will say, so long as it is enjoyable. Some, of a puritan bent, insist instead that it should be productive, by developing ourselves or helping others. Others, more Aristotelian, like Elizabeth Telfer [text attached below], think that it should involve the enjoyment of contemplating of truths and beauties, of discovery and creation, and of personal relations. What should we think? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 2 November, @ the Junction Inn Hotel
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If You Can do it for Free, Why Can't You do it for Money?
Many lament the way market thinking threatens to colonize other areas of life—recent examples include organ donation and surrogate motherhood. Not everything should be for sale, according to Michael Sandel [here], since life is even harder for the poor in a society where everything is for sale, and since, more fundamentally, putting a price on the good things in life—organs, babies, and so on—can corrupt them and our relations to them. But is money the problem, or something else? According to Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski [here], anything you may permissibly do for free, you may permissibly do for money. There is nothing in principle wrong with commodification, they claim. So who is right? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 5 October, @ the Junction Inn Hotel |
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Does Philosophy Have a Woman Problem?
Men greatly outnumber women in philosophy, making the field look more like engineering than the other humanities. For many [such as Marilyn Friedman, text attached below], this is a problem — women are being discouraged because of overt and implicit discrimination, because of sexual harassment, and because of the combative masculine style of philosophical discussion. For others [such as Christina Hoff-Sommers, text and video linked here], there is no more a problem with men's dominance in philosophy than there is with women's dominance in psychology, since, it is claimed, these differences reflect differences in the interests of men and women. So, what does explain the imbalance? Is it a problem? And what should be done about it? 10.30-12.00pm Saturday 7 September, @ the Junction Inn Hotel
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Do We Need Protection from the Tyranny of Public Opinion?
We face a dilemma. Freedom of association means that if I think what you say is hateful, I am free to avoid you and to convince others to do likewise. But if these others include your employer, or if I am your employer, this is a threat to freedom of speech. For example, Peter Singer has published controversial views about the disabled, and his position at Princeton University has been targeted by disability advocates [here], but also defended by others [here, by Catholic academic Robert George]. More recently, Israel Folau had his contract with Rugby Australia terminated after publicly expressing traditional Christian views about homosexuality that RA felt contravened their inclusive ethos, a move supported by some [here], but rejected by others [here, by Peter Singer himself]—So, do we need protection from the tyranny of public opinion? 10.30am-12.00pm Sat 3 August, @ the Junction Inn Hotel |
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Should Universities be Teaching Western Civilization?
In 2018, the Ramsay Center approached various universities with a proposal to lavishly fund a new specialist BA degree in Western Civilization, the underlying philosophy of which was enunciated in Robert Hutchins' 1952 essay The Great Conversation [abridged text below, but see here for the full text, and here for the University of Wollongong's degree]. For many, such a proposal is way past its use-by date in university humanities departments [here, but see also here]. They objected that its narrow focus is at odds with diversity and inclusion, that it implies some civilizations are superior to others, and, according to some, that it is European supremacism writ large—So, should universities be teaching western civilization? 10.30am-12.00pm Sat 6 July, @ the Junction Inn Hotel
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What Value does Science have for the Spirit?
Science gives us many useful things, but useful things are only ever for the sake of other, higher, things. By contrast, the arts give us culture, and religion gives us meaning. Richard Feynman [reading below] thinks that science allows the joyful imagination of things more marvelous than poetry, and seems to want to replace God by Nature as the object of our awe. But science can be used for harm, the joy is reserved only for specialists like Feynman, and are fuzzy images of black holes really a replacement for God? Damian Broderick [reading below] is aware of these sorts of problems, and thinks we need an erotics of science. So, can science give us more than just gadgets?—What value does science have for the spirit? 10.30am-12.00pm Sat 1 June, @ the Junction Inn Hotel
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If Animals have Rights, Should Robots?
We all think that animals have at least some rights, though there are different opinions about exactly why they do so. Some say it is because of their sentience, some because of rationality, and some because of our sympathy. But robots are getting smarter and smarter these days, and some people [for example here, also attached below] are beginning to seriously ask whether these sorts of reasons apply to robots as well. Are they sentient? Are they rational? Certainly, some robots are pretty cute. So we ask, if animals have rights, should robots? 10.30am-12.00pm Sat 4 May, @ the Junction Inn Hotel
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What are the limits of religious toleration?
The European Wars of Religion taught the West a bloody lesson in the value of mutual toleration between religious groups. The practices of traditional religious groups towards some of their members, however, seem discriminatory and unjust by the egalitarian standards of the liberal state (for example, here). Can these practices be tolerated? Some (such as Habermas, our main reading this month) suggest that these groups must simply adjust their beliefs to fit the egalitarian ethos. Others (such as Kymlicka) are more conciliatory. So what are the limits of religious toleration? 10-11.30am Sat 6 April, @ the Junction Inn Hotel
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How free can philosophy discussion be in the public domain?
This question is increasingly relevant to the way discussions are conducted, public and academic. This was particularly the case for the Same-Sex Marriage debate, in which it was suggested [here] that the debate itself was problematic. And the very same concerns have now entered into the universities, with a recent petition for a prominent anti-SSM academic, John Finnis, to be removed from his position for his views [discussion here]. But is real philosophical discussion just too dangerous in public places? 10-11.30am Sat 2 March 2019, @ the Junction Inn Hotel |