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What are the limits of religious toleration?

28/3/2019

The European Wars of Religion taught the West a bloody lesson in the value of mutual toleration between religious groups. The practices of traditional religious groups towards some of their members, however, seem discriminatory and unjust by the egalitarian standards of the liberal state (for example, here). Can these practices be tolerated? Some (such as Habermas) suggest that these groups must simply adjust their beliefs to fit the egalitarian ethos. Others (such as Kymlicka) are more conciliatory. So what are the limits of religious toleration?

Habermas, "Religious Tolerance"
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Kymlicka, "Toleration and its Limits"
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4 Comments

Joe M

28/3/2019 12:08:26 pm

On Kymlicka on Dialogue with the Illiberal

Kymlicka endorses—how shall we say?—a less-than-muscular version of liberalism. He thinks (p 165) that liberal principles are inconsistent with practices within minorities which restrict the rights and opportunities of (some of) their members, most often women. But he doesn't want to ban these so-called internal restrictions (except the most extreme), since that would impose liberal values on these illiberal minorities. Rather, he just wants to start with a bit of a chat to them (p 171).

There are two things to note about his position. First, his idea of dialogue turns out to be rather one-sided: "liberals have a right, and a responsibility, to speak out against injustice ... [and] should seek to promote their liberal principles, through reason or example" (168). Second, he does not say whether he will insist on this chat, and what he thinks the liberal state should do if the illiberal minority is simply not interested in having its members dialogue with outsiders (as they will not be, if the "dialogue" is as one-sided as he seems to suggest).

Still, muscular or not, Kymlicka is onto something (though not quite what he thinks). Take the two points above in reverse order.

We already accept the imposition of compulsory education. Though he does not mention it, an important aspect of current liberal states is their compulsory education systems which promote (among many other things) the liberal norm of "complete inclusion of all citizens as members with equal rights" (to quote Habermas, at p 11). Whether their parents want them to or not, Muslim children (and those from other traditional religious communities) must hear views and arguments (eg, in relation to same-sex marriage, or gender roles more generally) at odds with their religion. And rightly so, I am inclined to think.

But true dialogue is reciprocal. If Muslim children are made to listen to egalitarian arguments, then the other children should be made to listen to anti-egalitarian arguments, and all of them enabled to critically reflect on those arguments. (Enabled how far?—a difficult question, but whatever answer one is inclined to give, it must be the same for religious and non-religious children; does the inner-city child know any more about the Amish child's life, than the latter knows of former's life?) Adults cannot be legally obliged to critically reflect on their lives, and this includes (eg) whether to remain in the religious group in which they were brought up. For this reason, children in these groups (and more generally) must be provided with the capacity for critical reflection, so that they may fairly be held responsible for their lives as adults. It might even be that a liberal society should make philosophy compulsory for children.

So, my suggestion is that it is permissible for the liberal majority to impose dialogue on minorities and their members, but only if the illiberal minorities have exactly the same right to impose (their own) dialogue on the majority and its members. This view is not much more muscular than Kymlicka's, but the authoritarianism it involves is mitigated, I hope, by the fact that the imposition is of method rather than content, and that both sides have the right to put their case to the other.

Joe M

28/3/2019 04:14:34 pm

Habermas on the Concept of Toleration

Habermas' development of the concept of toleration starts well enough. You do not tolerate someone you agree with, or are indifferent to—you must reject them is some way. But for "subjectively good reasons", he adds. He quotes someone called Forst: "'If someone rejects people whose skin is black we should not call on him to be 'tolerant toward people who look different' ... For then we would accept his prejudice as an ethical judgment similar to the rejection of a different religion. A racist should not be tolerant, he should quite simply overcome his racism" (p 10). What gives us the right to say that the racist (and his mates, the sexist, the homophobe, etc) is prejudiced? Habermas' answer is that we give ourselves this right in light of "egalitarian and universalistic standards of democratic citizenship, something that calls for ... complete inclusion of all citizens as members with equal rights" (p 10). Of course, not everyone agrees with this standard, exactly as stated—the opponents of same-sex marriage, for example, wanted to deny same-sex couples the right to marry. But this does not matter, according to Habermas, since tolerance only begins where discrimination ends (p 11). We cannot accept the prejudice of opponents of same-sex marriage as some sort of bona fide ethical judgment. These homophobes should not be tolerant, they should quite simply overcome their homophobia (p 13). And by this he means that they must accept liberal beliefs, and adjust the rest of their worldview to fit: "those beliefs in which each person's ethos is rooted must be brought into harmony with the liberal norms of state and society" (p 11).

This is pretty troubling. A justified constitutional order cannot rest on a shared philosophical faith—including faith in the egalitarian standard. Let's start again.

What is it to be prejudiced? Obviously, Habermas supposes that a person's attitude towards another is prejudiced when it expresses the attitude, most weakly, that they deserve lesser rights than others, or, more strongly, that they are lesser members of humanity. The racist is prejudiced in this sense. The anti-SSM advocate is also prejudiced in this sense, since they think that same-sex couples deserve lesser rights regarding marriage, though it is arguable whether they are also committed to thinking that gays are lesser members of humanity. By contrast, the egalitarian is not prejudiced in this sense (but only by definition).

What should the anti-SSM advocate do about their prejudice, in this sense? Take someone like John Finis. Suppose that he has explicit arguments for his opposition to SSM, that he has examined all the main objections to that view, and has adequate responses to them (in the sense that it would be generally agreed, by supporters and opponents alike, that, at least from Finis's perspective, they constitute good responses). If this is so, why on earth should he change his views? For such a person, Habermas' insistence that he adopt the egalitarian belief is simply authoritarian.

Now not everyone is like Finis. Few anti-SSM advocates formulate their own arguments very well, they are not aware of all that might be said against them, and they do not always have good responses to objections. (Mind you, this is true of the average egalitarian as well.) Should they simply overcome their homophobia? No, they should not simply overcome their homophobia, if that just means (as it appears to) that they adopt the egalitarian belief just because their society demands it of them. It is not a fitting way for a rational person to form their beliefs, and, indeed, it is inconsistent with the liberal value of respect for autonomy to expect people to do so.

The anti-SSM advocate should therefore not change their beliefs just to conform to the views of their society, but they certainly should change their actions to conform to the laws of their society. Habermas objects to this, that mere obedience to law is a mere modus vivendi under externally imposed laws (p 12). But it is commonplace for a person to disagree with their group's decision, on the basis of their own thinking, but even so do their part implementing that decision, out of their commitment to the group. So too it is possible for the anti-SSM advocate to disagree with the legalization of same-sex marriage, according to their own autonomous judgment, but even so to conform their behavior to that new law, out of a commitment to the democratic process. For this person, the law is in one sense imposed (since they do not agree with it), but in another sense not (since they accept the process by which it came about). Pace Habermas, it is the very epitome of tolerance.

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2/11/2022 11:40:31 am

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5/3/2025 02:09:36 pm

It is important to consider the limits of religious toleration in a modern society.

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What are the limits of religious toleration?

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