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How free can philosophy discussion be in the public domain?

18/3/2019

This question is increasingly relevant to the way discussions are conducted, public and academic. This was particularly the case for the Same-Sex Marriage debate, in which it was suggested [here] that the debate itself was problematic. And the very same concerns have now entered into the universities, with a recent petition for a prominent anti-SSM academic, John Finnis, to be removed from his position for his views [discussion here].

These cases raise immediate questions: Is it wrong to SAY that heterosexual relations are morally superior to homosexual relations? Does it matter whether it is true or not? Is there an inoffensive way of saying such a thing? If not, is the offense enough to make it wrong? To mean that it should be illegal? How CAN we have this sort of discussion? But there are also broader questions: How can we discuss ANYTHING about which opposing sides feel very strongly, if at all? Is sincere offense enough to make speech wrong? How free CAN philosophical discussion be in the public domain? Or is real philosophical discussion just too dangerous in public places?

7 Comments

Joe Mintoff

22/3/2019 12:27:54 pm

Taking my cue from Mill, my suggestion is that (i) each person should have the liberty to publicly profess and discuss any doctrine they sincerely believe, no matter how wrong or offensive, and (ii) to do so under regulations (if any) that apply to all other doctrines and that are not based on its being wrong or offensive, so long as (iii) to do so does not itself present a clear and present danger of harm to others.

We already accept a principle of political equality—that, in regulating people's access to public spaces (eg to Merewether beach), we should not discriminate on the basis of their political opinions. But there is no line between political and moral opinions. Hence we should also accept a principle of moral equality—that, in regulating people's access to public spaces (eg, speaking in public), we should not discriminate on the basis of their moral opinions. This implies (ii) and (i). Of course, sometimes speech acts themselves cause harm (does going to Merewether beach ever do so?), and so we need something like (iii).

Oddly enough, the writer of the Conversation piece seems to come very close to this view. She concludes: "Free speech means [(i)] there is no topic [nor opinion on that topic?] that ought to be considered off-limits in public debate. But a robust free speech principle also means [(ii)] we have a responsibility [imposed equally on all parties?] to discuss any and all topics in ways [(iii)] that do not harm others."

But I fear that we will differ as to what this amounts to in practice. The Australian Christian Lobby wanted to be able to say that same-sex marriages are not real marriages. Saying this, even in polite tones, may well be wrong and offensive, but is it a harm in the relevant sense? The author reckons that even the ACL knows that it is: "they are aware their words are likely to harm, marginalise, exclude and discriminate against LBGTIQ people". I'm not so sure.

Alan Duncan

27/3/2019 01:53:10 pm

I think we should start by noting different notions of free speech domains by looking at the different spheres it is generally thought to apply to. Firstly, there's the governmental sort of free speech - aka whether or not you can be prosecuted for your speech. Secondly, there's employment free speech - aka whether can you be legitimately fired or otherwise disciplined for your speech by your employer. Thirdly, there's platform free speech - aka whether you are entitled (in some sense, in some institution) to a platform on which to speak.

The first sort I see as generally unproblematic - I doubt anyone really wants the government interfering in people's ability to speak whatever they wish, unless it is a call to violence or part of planning or instituting some other crime. Mill's view as referenced by Joe appears to primarily apply to this sphere, and broadly I think it is apt. What is less clear cut is speech that 'leads to harm' - and anti-LGBTQ speech certainly falls in this category. People regularly use anti-LGBTQ sentiments to justify the harm they do to people in that community, and the more support they see they have from people in higher societal stations the more justified they will feel in doing so. This said - I don't think this sort should be policed as anything like 'hate speech'. If there is clearly no intent to incite violence, it seems sketchy, to say the least, to police speech that 'might lead to someone using it as a part of their justification for violence'.

The second sort I find to be difficult. I strongly dislike the idea that your employer can determine what you can and can't say - at threat of your livelihood. Obviously, there are valid reasons for an employer to fire someone based on their speech, if they are insulting others at work for example. But more commonly these days we are seeing people get fired for their speech off-the-clock. See for example this article: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-20/high-court-michaela-banerji--lalegale-canberra/10918304 This is a case where someone was fired from their government job because she posted critical tweets about the government's policies. This example blurs the line between this category and the former, since the government is the employer in this case, however I think the answer to this category is fairly straightforward. If you are on the clock it makes sense that you can be fired for your speech if it is detrimental to the employer's business, if you are not on the clock I think we would all prefer to be able to speak how we please without fear that we are going to lose our livelihoods if our employer should overhear.

The third sort of free speech is rather tricky. We see this a lot with the sort of example provided in the original post. Who gets to speak at a university? Plainly - those with the relevant expertise. I don't think there's any straightforward way to deal with people who have the relevant expertise - but also happen to hold other abhorrent views in other spheres when people would protest the latter. I think for any platform, such as a university lecture theater, you would have to do a cost-benefit analysis as to whether or not it is worth dealing with the backlash you would receive if you give voice to someone who is controversial. This said - academic speech has to be protected if academia is to produce actual results. Within the context of an actual academic theory and academic response, on-the-job speech for academics have to be protected from outside backlash - otherwise the academic will have to fear their job any time they suggest a controversial idea. But this should only apply within their realm of expertise. If a professor of mathematics outs themselves as a racist in the course of their work, plainly this should not be protected.

Unfortunately, it seems, by the standards I set out, Finnis' job should be protected. Moral statements are certainly a part of a philosopher's relevant expertise, and his views were given in an academic context as a part of his work. This said, however, were I in charge of the university he was employed at, I would be keeping a keen eye on whether or not his views would constitute a bias which may wind up violating the university's policy.

Joe M

28/3/2019 03:35:02 pm

Hi Alan.

The interesting thing about the case you post is that it involves two complications: (1) it involves political speech, and (2) the employer is actually the government. These might be difference-making factors. So, questions to ask:

Re (1): Do you think there should be greater protection from being sacked for political speech, as opposed to moral speech (eg, expressing a sexist opinion) or even actions (eg, footballers who are let go because of off-field conduct)?—Given my comment, I guess I am committed to say that there should be the same level of protection, but my claims related only to access to public spaces. This leads to . . .

Re (2): Do you think there should be greater protection from being sacked from a government employer, as opposed to a private employer?—Myself, I think the rules could be different in these two cases.

The key issue is whether the speech (on-the-job or not) affects the person's ability "to do their job". But what is this? There is a narrow understanding, of being able to well perform the technical tasks one is assigned (eg, scoring tries at an acceptable rate, to pursue the footballing example). But there is also a broad understanding, of contributing overall to all the goals of the organisation (ie, by not bringing the game in disrepute by one's off-the-field shenanigans). Both of these affect the bottom line, and so, arguably, both are relevant to whether or not you should keep your job. What do you think?

29/3/2019 04:33:37 am

Hi Joe,

Re (1): I think ultimately it would be hard to determine which sphere a particular act of 'speech' falls under - especially when it comes to the distinction between 'moral' and 'political' speech, each which I would argue are more often that not functions of the other. So in a sense, yes, I would say they would be best given equal protections if only to avoid constant semantics.

Re (2): While I think the rules could be different in these cases - I don't think this is necessarily a good way to go. You could say that the governmental case is a little too close to violating my 'first sort' of free speech - the one which is most preferable to be an ironclad protection. However, I strongly dislike, almost as much as the idea of government censorship, censorship from an employer. With the caveat that some information is clearly private and should not be shared outside of work (be that government or private), I do not think there should be any legal action or speech someone can take outside of work which would be grounds for disciplinary action within work hours.

After considering the footballer example for some time I think it is perhaps the most heard of - yet most eccentric example of a company punishing someone for their off-the-clock actions. At the end of the day if I wind up supporting a view that doesn't allow a multi-billion dollar company to punish a multi-millionaire employee who they were marketing as a star because they cost them millions when they got drunk and were recorded saying something stupid - this would not be the worst consequence of my view. Although that said - all a company such as this would need to do is instead say they are hiring the footballer 24/7 (assuming this doesn't violate some labour laws) not to do those sorts of things also - and just spread out their pay to cover for that. So long as they are being paid at least minimum wage for each of those hours, I would see this as no issue.

I think the more common applications of off-the-clock censorship, and the ones which motivate my view, are the more insidious. Consider when fast-food companies forbid their employees from saying (or tweeting) anything negative about their company, their work conditions, their pay, etc. When companies fire people for trying to organise, It's bad enough that bosses get to bully people by holding their livelihoods over their head on a day to day basis during work, but it's even worse when that can follow you home.

2/4/2019 11:24:08 am

Hi Alan

You are on popular grounds when you say that employers should not have legal rights to punish and/or sack employees for their speech outside of work hours, this being even worse than doing so when employees try to organize.

So this is more of a problem for me, since I am quite sympathetic to the principle that if A hires B because they want B to contribute to their business (why else do employers hire people?), then, if B detracts from the business (in the course of their work, or even when they are not on the job), then I can perfectly well understand why A no longer wants to have anything to do with B (let alone continuing to pay B for the privilege of undermining their business).

My confidence in the application of this principle to various cases varies, however, from highest to lowest: (1) footballer with off-field shenanigans; (2) employees tweeting negative things about (eg) the company's products (do you really think this is acceptable?); (3) employees tweeting negative things about the company's workplace relations; (4) employees organizing at work. I am happiest with (1) and (2), and less happy about having to say that (3) and (4) are OK, and if I want to draw a distinction here, the key issue for me will be on the basis of what principle.

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